I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and, by courtesy, of Law at Stanford University, an ACLS Fellow, and the Principal Investigator of the Informal Political Representation and the Recovery of Public Trust Project. My primary research is in social and political philosophy, moral philosophy, Black political thought, philosophy of race, and philosophy of law. I also work on questions in feminist philosophy, criminal law, constitutional law, bioethics, and legal ethics. I am currently writing a book, Not Just Speaking for Ourselves (under contract with Harvard University Press), about the ethics of informal political representation. I received my Ph.D. in Philosophy from Harvard University, my J.D. from Stanford Law School, and my B.A. in Philosophy and Africana Studies from New York University. I have served as a law clerk to the Honorable Judge Rosemary Barkett and the Honorable Judge Adalberto Jordan on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Miami, Florida, and as a legal adviser to Judge Barkett on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague. I was born and raised in Hackensack, New Jersey, a city I love.
My CV is available here. You can contact me at salkin at stanford dot edu.
My CV is available here. You can contact me at salkin at stanford dot edu.
Book
Not Just Speaking for Ourselves (under contract with Harvard University Press)
Formal political representation is a familiar topic within democratic theory. Much less discussed, though no less widespread, is informal political representation: a practice in which a person speaks or acts for a group before an audience, despite never having been elected or selected by means of a formal, systematized election or selection procedure. Familiar examples abound: Me Too Movement leader Tarana Burke informally represents sexual assault, abuse, and harassment survivors. Black Lives Matter informally represents Black communities throughout the United States and beyond. Former Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School student Aalayah Eastmond informally represents not only fellow former classmates but American high schoolers generally, as when she testified before Congress: “We are the generation that will end gun violence.” Informal political representation is nothing new. It has long played a role in the public expression of the values, interests, and preferences of groups, particularly oppressed and marginalized groups. Yet, no one has developed a systematic normative theory of informal political representation. Not Just Speaking for Ourselves does just that.
There is a tension at the very heart of the informal political representative’s (IPR’s) relationship to the represented group. On the one hand, there is a need, sometimes desperate, for informal political representation. IPRs provide valuable political goods to those they represent: voicing groups’ neglected interests, making overlooked groups visible, stirring group consciousness, serving as communicative conduits between represented groups and their unresponsive lawmakers, and negotiating on represented groups’ behalves. The practice can be especially valuable for members of oppressed and marginalized groups, which tend to lack the political power that would aid them in redressing their oppression or marginalization. Though unelected, IPRs come to speak for these groups in many fora, at protests and on picket lines, from the kitchen table to Congress. On the other hand, there is a danger built into the practice, unmoored as it is from the protections and safeguards available (at least in theory) in formal political representative contexts. Without institutional or procedural constraints, IPRs may wield their power to influence what becomes of the represented free from fear of reprisal or rebuke. So positioned, they may gravely mischaracterize or overpower the represented. To make matters worse, IPRs are often the only political actors working to advance the interests of oppressed and marginalized groups, meaning that these groups come to rely on their IPRs. These circumstances, taken together, leave vulnerable groups at the mercy of their IPRs, rendering such relationships inegalitarian and, sometimes, oppressive. Such dangers lead skeptics to the conclusion that informal political representation is morally irremediable.
So, there is a puzzle here: How may IPRs fulfill their roles without falling prey to criticism for undertaking activities central to these roles? Not Just Speaking for Ourselves answers this question. In chapter one, I provide a general analytical framework for understanding informal political representation. I argue that a person or group emerges as an IPR when and because they are taken by an audience to speak or act on behalf of a group in a context—call this audience uptake. Characterizing the phenomenon this way reveals that a person can become an IPR unwittingly or unwillingly (conscripted IPRs), wielding powers they did not ask for but cannot always easily reject—these powers are discussed in chapter two. In subsequent chapters, I build on this framework to address four kinds of moral challenges that emerge for IPRs. In chapter three, I consider what pro tanto duties IPRs have to those they represent and on what grounds conscripted IPRs may reasonably reject the ascription of these duties. In chapter four, I respond to skeptical challenges set out in the book’s introduction and, by so doing, provide an account of willing IPRs’ duties to those they represent. In chapter five, I (1) critically examine various arguments advanced in favor of, respectively, representation by people who share characteristics, experiences, or backgrounds in common with those they represent (descriptive representation) and representation by people who are members of the group they represent (member representation), and (2) consider whether there are ever compelling reasons to allow for IPRs who are neither descriptively similar to nor members of the groups as those they represent (nondescriptive nonmember representatives). In chapter six, I consider whether and if so when IPRs should defer to those they represent about matters in which the IPRs are experts.
Whether movement leaders or just everyday people, IPRs are fundamental for the public expression of the interests of many, particularly marginalized and oppressed groups. They emerge both within and beyond traditional political fora—some testify before Congress, others before Twitter. Though unelected, IPRs can have significant power to influence how those they represent are regarded by a wide variety of audiences. Such power generates unexpected duties for both IPRs and their audiences. And, as it turns out, any one of us may be called upon to be an IPR—despite our best efforts and over our objections, often, we are not just speaking for ourselves.
Formal political representation is a familiar topic within democratic theory. Much less discussed, though no less widespread, is informal political representation: a practice in which a person speaks or acts for a group before an audience, despite never having been elected or selected by means of a formal, systematized election or selection procedure. Familiar examples abound: Me Too Movement leader Tarana Burke informally represents sexual assault, abuse, and harassment survivors. Black Lives Matter informally represents Black communities throughout the United States and beyond. Former Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School student Aalayah Eastmond informally represents not only fellow former classmates but American high schoolers generally, as when she testified before Congress: “We are the generation that will end gun violence.” Informal political representation is nothing new. It has long played a role in the public expression of the values, interests, and preferences of groups, particularly oppressed and marginalized groups. Yet, no one has developed a systematic normative theory of informal political representation. Not Just Speaking for Ourselves does just that.
There is a tension at the very heart of the informal political representative’s (IPR’s) relationship to the represented group. On the one hand, there is a need, sometimes desperate, for informal political representation. IPRs provide valuable political goods to those they represent: voicing groups’ neglected interests, making overlooked groups visible, stirring group consciousness, serving as communicative conduits between represented groups and their unresponsive lawmakers, and negotiating on represented groups’ behalves. The practice can be especially valuable for members of oppressed and marginalized groups, which tend to lack the political power that would aid them in redressing their oppression or marginalization. Though unelected, IPRs come to speak for these groups in many fora, at protests and on picket lines, from the kitchen table to Congress. On the other hand, there is a danger built into the practice, unmoored as it is from the protections and safeguards available (at least in theory) in formal political representative contexts. Without institutional or procedural constraints, IPRs may wield their power to influence what becomes of the represented free from fear of reprisal or rebuke. So positioned, they may gravely mischaracterize or overpower the represented. To make matters worse, IPRs are often the only political actors working to advance the interests of oppressed and marginalized groups, meaning that these groups come to rely on their IPRs. These circumstances, taken together, leave vulnerable groups at the mercy of their IPRs, rendering such relationships inegalitarian and, sometimes, oppressive. Such dangers lead skeptics to the conclusion that informal political representation is morally irremediable.
So, there is a puzzle here: How may IPRs fulfill their roles without falling prey to criticism for undertaking activities central to these roles? Not Just Speaking for Ourselves answers this question. In chapter one, I provide a general analytical framework for understanding informal political representation. I argue that a person or group emerges as an IPR when and because they are taken by an audience to speak or act on behalf of a group in a context—call this audience uptake. Characterizing the phenomenon this way reveals that a person can become an IPR unwittingly or unwillingly (conscripted IPRs), wielding powers they did not ask for but cannot always easily reject—these powers are discussed in chapter two. In subsequent chapters, I build on this framework to address four kinds of moral challenges that emerge for IPRs. In chapter three, I consider what pro tanto duties IPRs have to those they represent and on what grounds conscripted IPRs may reasonably reject the ascription of these duties. In chapter four, I respond to skeptical challenges set out in the book’s introduction and, by so doing, provide an account of willing IPRs’ duties to those they represent. In chapter five, I (1) critically examine various arguments advanced in favor of, respectively, representation by people who share characteristics, experiences, or backgrounds in common with those they represent (descriptive representation) and representation by people who are members of the group they represent (member representation), and (2) consider whether there are ever compelling reasons to allow for IPRs who are neither descriptively similar to nor members of the groups as those they represent (nondescriptive nonmember representatives). In chapter six, I consider whether and if so when IPRs should defer to those they represent about matters in which the IPRs are experts.
Whether movement leaders or just everyday people, IPRs are fundamental for the public expression of the interests of many, particularly marginalized and oppressed groups. They emerge both within and beyond traditional political fora—some testify before Congress, others before Twitter. Though unelected, IPRs can have significant power to influence how those they represent are regarded by a wide variety of audiences. Such power generates unexpected duties for both IPRs and their audiences. And, as it turns out, any one of us may be called upon to be an IPR—despite our best efforts and over our objections, often, we are not just speaking for ourselves.
Papers
Articles
Salkin, W. (2021). Democracy Within, Justice Without: The Duties of Informal Political Representatives. Noûs. doi: 10.1111/nous.12391
Salkin, W. (2021). The Conscription of Informal Political Representatives. Journal of Political Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/jopp.12246
Salkin, W. (2020). Judicial Representation: Speaking for Others from the Bench. In I. Cohen, C. Shachar, A. Silvers, & M. Stein (Eds.), Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics (pp. 211-220). Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781108622851.023
Papers in Progress
“Ameliorative Legal Institutions”
“On Incrementalism”
“Racism and the Requirements of Justice” (for an upcoming Politics, Philosophy and Economics workshop)
“Speaking for Others From the Bench”
“Speaking For, Speaking About, Speaking With, Speaking Out”
“You Say I Want a Revolution” (for special issue of The Monist on Du Bois and democracy)
Public Engagement
"Wendy Salkin on Informal Political Representation," in Myisha Cherry's Unmuted (Oxford, 2020)
"Democracy Within, Justice Without: The Duties of Informal Political Representatives," Harvard Horizons Symposium, May 4, 2018
"Speaking for Others," Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences News, Dec. 12, 2017
"Wendy Salkin on Informal Representation," The UnMute Podcast, Oct. 3, 2017
Research Support
My research has been generously supported by the following fellowships: the ACLS Fellowship (2021-2022), the Stanford Cultivating Humanities and Social Sciences Grant (2021-2024), the Clayman Institute for Gender Research Faculty Research Fellowship (2020-2021); the Collaborative Visiting Fellowship at the ConceptLab at the University of Oslo (June 2018); the Harvard Horizons Society Scholarship (2017-2018); the Andrew W. Mellon Sawyer Graduate Fellowship at Boston University (2017-2018); the Dissertation Completion Fellowship at Harvard University (2017-2018); the Martin Fellowship at the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University (Spring 2017); the Student Fellowship at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School (2016-2017); the Graduate Fellowship in Ethics at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University (2015-2016); the Bioethics Bootcamp Fellowship at the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania (June 2014); and the Student Fellowship at the Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences at Stanford Law School (2012-2013).
Salkin, W. (2021). Democracy Within, Justice Without: The Duties of Informal Political Representatives. Noûs. doi: 10.1111/nous.12391
- Abstract: Informal political representation can be a political lifeline, particularly for oppressed and marginalized groups. Such representation can give these groups some say, however mediate, partial, and imperfect, in how things go for them. Coeval with the political goods such representation offers these groups are its particular dangers for them. Mindful of these dangers, skeptics challenge the practice for being, inter alia, unaccountable, unauthorized, inegalitarian, and oppressive. These challenges provide strong pro tanto reasons to think the practice morally impermissible. This paper considers the question: On what conditions is the informal political representation of oppressed and marginalized groups permissible? By responding to skeptics’ challenges, I develop a systematic account of moral constraints that, if adopted, would make such representation permissible. The account that emerges shows that informal political representatives (IPRs) must aim to fulfill two sets of sometimes conflicting duties to the represented: democracy within duties, which concern how the representative treats and relates to the represented, and justice without duties, which concern how the representative’s actions advance the aims of the representation.
Salkin, W. (2021). The Conscription of Informal Political Representatives. Journal of Political Philosophy. doi: 10.1111/jopp.12246
- Abstract: Informal political representation—the phenomenon of speaking or acting on behalf of others although one has not been elected or selected to do so by means of a systematized election or selection procedure—plays a crucial role in advancing the interests of groups. Sometimes, those who emerge as informal political representatives (IPRs) do so willingly (voluntary representatives). But, often, people end up being IPRs, either in their private lives or in more public political forums, over their own protests (unwilling representatives) or even without their knowledge (unwitting representatives)—that is, they are conscripted. None of the few theories of informal political representation extant accommodate conscripted IPRs. The account detailed here introduces the phenomenon of conscripted informal political representation and explains its place in a complete theory of informal political representation. Conscripted IPRs can, like their voluntary counterparts, come to have significant power to influence how various audiences regard those for whom the conscripted IPRs speak or act. Upon attaining such power to influence, conscripted IPRs, like their voluntary counterparts, come to have pro tanto duties to those they represent—duties that arise despite IPRs’ unwittingness or unwillingness. Understanding the phenomenon of conscripted informal political representation allows us to surface essential normative questions about informal political representation that are otherwise occluded.
Salkin, W. (2020). Judicial Representation: Speaking for Others from the Bench. In I. Cohen, C. Shachar, A. Silvers, & M. Stein (Eds.), Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics (pp. 211-220). Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781108622851.023
- Abstract: Being represented has value. When another speaks for me, they can give voice to my perspective or interests in fora where my perspective or interests might otherwise go unheard or even unspoken. They may give voice to interests which I do not know how to express or which I do not even know I have. Our traditional understanding of political representation is that it is an activity that takes place only or mostly in discrete and easily recognizable legislative fora – for instance, the Senate or the House of Representatives. But, if we instead think of political representation as a practice of speaking or acting for others that could, in theory, arise anywhere a person’s or a group’s interests arise, then it turns out that political representation may take place anywhere there is a speaker or an actor and an audience.
Papers in Progress
“Ameliorative Legal Institutions”
“On Incrementalism”
“Racism and the Requirements of Justice” (for an upcoming Politics, Philosophy and Economics workshop)
“Speaking for Others From the Bench”
“Speaking For, Speaking About, Speaking With, Speaking Out”
“You Say I Want a Revolution” (for special issue of The Monist on Du Bois and democracy)
Public Engagement
"Wendy Salkin on Informal Political Representation," in Myisha Cherry's Unmuted (Oxford, 2020)
"Democracy Within, Justice Without: The Duties of Informal Political Representatives," Harvard Horizons Symposium, May 4, 2018
"Speaking for Others," Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences News, Dec. 12, 2017
"Wendy Salkin on Informal Representation," The UnMute Podcast, Oct. 3, 2017
Research Support
My research has been generously supported by the following fellowships: the ACLS Fellowship (2021-2022), the Stanford Cultivating Humanities and Social Sciences Grant (2021-2024), the Clayman Institute for Gender Research Faculty Research Fellowship (2020-2021); the Collaborative Visiting Fellowship at the ConceptLab at the University of Oslo (June 2018); the Harvard Horizons Society Scholarship (2017-2018); the Andrew W. Mellon Sawyer Graduate Fellowship at Boston University (2017-2018); the Dissertation Completion Fellowship at Harvard University (2017-2018); the Martin Fellowship at the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University (Spring 2017); the Student Fellowship at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School (2016-2017); the Graduate Fellowship in Ethics at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University (2015-2016); the Bioethics Bootcamp Fellowship at the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania (June 2014); and the Student Fellowship at the Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences at Stanford Law School (2012-2013).
Talks
* invited; † COVID-19 cancellations, postponements
“Speaking For, Speaking About, Speaking With, Speaking Out”
Invited Panelist
Law in the Public Interest, Stanford Women in Law, Stanford University, February 2021
New Perspectives in Critical Race Scholarship, CCSRE, Stanford University, February 2020
Ask a Philosopher Panel, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, November 2018
Philosophy in an Inclusive Key (PIKSI) Boston, MIT, Cambridge, MA, June 2017
Censorship in South Florida and Beyond, Museum of Contemporary Art, Miami, August 2016
Feminist Philosophy and Essentialism Conference, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2012
“Speaking For, Speaking About, Speaking With, Speaking Out”
- Dartmouth Economics and Philosophy Summer Workshop, TBD * †
- Constructing Social Hierarchies Workshop, University of Melbourne, July 2022 * †
- Judges as Representatives, Pompeu Fabra University, June 2022 * †
- Legal Theory Workshop, University of Toronto, March 2022 *
- Legal Theory Workshop, University of Virginia, April 2021 *
- Legal Philosophy Workshop, June 2020
- Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 2019 *
- Beyond Disadvantage: Disability, Law, and Bioethics, Harvard Law School, June 2018
- Philosophy Desert Workshop, Moab, UT, April 2022 *
- North American Society for Social Philosophy panel, American Philosophical Association (Pacific), April 2022 * †
- Stanford Political Theory Workshop, Stanford University, May 2020 *
- PPE Workshop, Political Economy Department, King’s College London, May 2020 * †
- UCSD Political Theory Workshop, UCSD, April 2020 *
- Department of Philosophy, UC Merced, November 2019 *
- Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia, August 2019
- Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain, June 2019 *
- Bechtel Workshop, Northwestern University, September 2018 *
- Rights and Wrongs Conference, San Francisco State University, September 2018
- Economics and Philosophy Workshop, Santa Fe, NM, August 2018 *
- ConceptLab, University of Oslo, June 2018 *
- Philosophy Department Colloquium, UC Davis, April 2022 *
- The Practical, the Political and the Ethical, Institute of Philosophy, May 2021 *
- Rutgers Feminist Philosophy Workshop, Rutgers University, March 2021 *
- Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, MIT, December 2020 *
- Clayman Institute for Gender Research, Stanford University, December 2020 *
- Values in Science and Political Philosophy Conference, Claremont McKenna College, March 2022 *
- Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, February 2022 *
- Politics, Philosophy and Economics Workshop on Race and PPE, New Orleans, LA, March 2022 *
- Transformations of Democracy Workshop, Stanford University, September 2021
- Manuscript Review Workshop, Stanford Humanities Center, Stanford University, December 2021
- Stanford Political Theory Workshop, Stanford University, September 2020 *
- UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, UCLA, April 2020 *
- Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, January 2019 *
- Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, January 2019 *
- California Philosophy Workshop, Malibu, CA, October 2018 *
- The New York City Minorities and Philosophy Workshop, NYU, May 2018
- Princeton Workshop in Social Philosophy, Princeton University, February 2018
- Symposium, American Philosophical Association (Central), Chicago, IL, February 2018
- Philosophers’ Cocoon Philosophy Conference, University of Tampa, October 2017
- Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Annual Meeting, Clearwater Beach, FL, October 2017
- American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, September 2017 *
- Caribbean Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, New York, NY, June 2017
- Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, MIT, February 2017 *
- Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, January 2017 *
- Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, January 2017 *
- Gender, Race, and Sexuality Seminar, Philosophy, University of Barcelona, June 2019
- Stanford Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Conference, Stanford University, April 2019
- Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 2019 *
- North American Society for Social Philosophy, San Francisco, CA, July 2019
- Race and Representation course, Hackensack High School, Hackensack, NJ, June 2020
- ConceptLab, University of Oslo, January 2019
- American Philosophical Association (Pacific), San Diego, CA, March 2018
- MIT Day of Action, MIT, April 2017
- Harvard-Edinburgh Legal Theory Colloquium, University of Edinburgh, February 2017
- Legal Philosophy Workshop, Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada, June 2016
- Police, Prisons, & Power Conference, CUNY Graduate Center, April 2013
- Philosophy of ‘Race’ and Racism Conference, University of Oxford, June 2016
- UCLA Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference, UCLA, April 2016
Invited Panelist
Law in the Public Interest, Stanford Women in Law, Stanford University, February 2021
New Perspectives in Critical Race Scholarship, CCSRE, Stanford University, February 2020
Ask a Philosopher Panel, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, November 2018
Philosophy in an Inclusive Key (PIKSI) Boston, MIT, Cambridge, MA, June 2017
Censorship in South Florida and Beyond, Museum of Contemporary Art, Miami, August 2016
Feminist Philosophy and Essentialism Conference, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2012
Teaching
Stanford University
Representation: Race, Law, and Politics (graduate seminar), primary instructor, Winter 2021
Philosophy of Law: Protest, Punishment, and Racial Justice, primary instructor, Winter 2021
Citizenship, co-taught with Sara Mrsny, Winter 2021
Du Bois and Democracy, primary instructor, Winter 2020
Law and Philosophy, primary instructor, Winter 2020
Speaking for Others (graduate seminar), primary instructor, Autumn 2019
San Francisco State University
Du Bois and Democracy (graduate seminar), primary instructor, Spring 2019
Philosophy of Law, primary instructor, Fall 2018
Legal Field Project in Philosophy, primary instructor, Fall 2018 and Spring 2019
Ethics in Medicine, primary instructor, Spring 2014
Philosophy of Law, primary instructor, Spring 2014
Prison University Project, San Quentin State Prison
Democracy and Mass Incarceration, co-instructor and seminar coordinator, Spring 2013
American Incarceration from a Global Perspective, co-instructor, Spring 2012
Harvard University
Democracy: Normative Foundations, primary instructor, Fall 2016
Saints, Heretics and Atheists: An Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, head teaching fellow for Jeffrey McDonough, Spring 2010
History of Modern Philosophy, teaching fellow for Alison Simmons, Fall 2009
Representation: Race, Law, and Politics (graduate seminar), primary instructor, Winter 2021
Philosophy of Law: Protest, Punishment, and Racial Justice, primary instructor, Winter 2021
Citizenship, co-taught with Sara Mrsny, Winter 2021
Du Bois and Democracy, primary instructor, Winter 2020
Law and Philosophy, primary instructor, Winter 2020
Speaking for Others (graduate seminar), primary instructor, Autumn 2019
San Francisco State University
Du Bois and Democracy (graduate seminar), primary instructor, Spring 2019
Philosophy of Law, primary instructor, Fall 2018
Legal Field Project in Philosophy, primary instructor, Fall 2018 and Spring 2019
Ethics in Medicine, primary instructor, Spring 2014
Philosophy of Law, primary instructor, Spring 2014
Prison University Project, San Quentin State Prison
Democracy and Mass Incarceration, co-instructor and seminar coordinator, Spring 2013
American Incarceration from a Global Perspective, co-instructor, Spring 2012
Harvard University
Democracy: Normative Foundations, primary instructor, Fall 2016
Saints, Heretics and Atheists: An Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, head teaching fellow for Jeffrey McDonough, Spring 2010
History of Modern Philosophy, teaching fellow for Alison Simmons, Fall 2009
My Dog, Birdie
