Book
Not Just Speaking for Ourselves (under contract with Harvard University Press)
It is possible that, as you read this, there is someone out there standing in for you, speaking in your voice, acting in your stead, making agreements on your behalf, or conceding a point you might not have wanted them to. They are not your congressperson, your lawyer, or your spouse—nor anyone else authorized by means of a formal, corporately organized election or selection procedure. There is another sort of representative out there, someone you did not elect, someone you perhaps would not elect, of whom you may never have heard, speaking or acting on your behalf right now—they are an informal political representative.
Formal political representation is a familiar topic within democratic theory. Much less discussed, though no less widespread, is informal political representation: a practice in which a person speaks or acts for a group before an audience, despite never having been elected or selected to do so by means of a corporately organized election or selection procedure. Informal political representation is an everyday feature of our public communicative landscape. It is woven taut into the fabric of our political lives. Malala Yousafzai claims: “I speak not for myself, but so those without a voice can be heard.” U2 frontman Bono claims to “represent a lot of people who have no voice at all.” President Trump, before his nomination, was said “to give a voice to those who have long felt silenced."
The informal political representative, though neither elected nor selected, is ubiquitous and influential. They increase the visibility of marginalized and oppressed groups, give voice to interests not adequately expressed in formal political fora, influence public discourse, and serve as conduits between the represented and policymakers. They can, as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., did in Montgomery, negotiate on a group’s behalf. But so far, few have attempted to provide a theory of this phenomenon that gives full attention to its normative foundations. Not Just Speaking for Ourselves provides a theory of informal political representation that does not treat the phenomenon as a mere deviant case of formal political representation, but rather takes informal political representation on its own terms.
Papers
Published
Judicial Representation: Speaking for Others from the Bench - In Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2020)
Under Review
Democracy Within, Justice Without: The Informal Political Representation of Unjustly Oppressed and Marginalized Groups
Informal representation can play an important and distinctive role in promoting a society of equals but, to do so, informal representatives must promote relationships with the represented that foreground such democratic values as respect, publicity, transparency, and openness to criticism, and that eschew domination and suppression of dissent.
In Progress
The Conscription of Informal Political Representatives
Informal political representation, the phenomenon of speaking or acting on behalf of others outside of formal political contexts, plays a crucial role in advancing the interests of groups, particularly marginalized and oppressed groups. I advance a new theory of the emergence conditions for becoming an informal political representative and explains how this theory allows us to get at key normative questions that are occluded by existing accounts.
Why Should Those Who Speak for Us Be Anything Like Us?
Why should those who speak for us be anything like us? I argue, contra widely endorsed principles long held by political representation theorists, in many cases, they shouldn't.
The Limits of Deference: Reexamining a Core Principle of Political Representation
When should those who speak for us defer to us about how to speak for us?
Speaking for Others from the Bench
Judicial representation occurs when, by virtue of what a judge says from the bench they come to speak or act on behalf of the members of a group whose interests are at stake in a case. This paper introduces and develops the concept of judicial representation as it arises in contexts where the represented group's members are, in some sense, unable to speak for themselves. It then advances an account of what a judge must know in order to be a good judicial representative.
Ways to learn more about my research: watch my talk at the Harvard Horizons Symposium, listen to or read my interview on The UnMute Podcast with Myisha Cherry, or read my interview with the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
In addition, I am in the early stages of developing two further projects: one concerns political action, the other concerns legal institutions.
My research has been generously supported by the following fellowships: the Collaborative Visiting Fellowship at the ConceptLab at the University of Oslo (June 2018); the Harvard Horizons Society Scholarship (2017-2018); the Andrew W. Mellon Sawyer Graduate Fellowship at Boston University (2017-2018); the Dissertation Completion Fellowship at Harvard University (2017-2018); the Martin Fellowship at the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University (Spring 2017); the Student Fellowship at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School (2016-2017); the Graduate Fellowship in Ethics at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University (2015-2016); the Bioethics Bootcamp Fellowship at the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania (June 2014); and the Student Fellowship at the Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences at Stanford Law School (2012-2013).
Not Just Speaking for Ourselves (under contract with Harvard University Press)
It is possible that, as you read this, there is someone out there standing in for you, speaking in your voice, acting in your stead, making agreements on your behalf, or conceding a point you might not have wanted them to. They are not your congressperson, your lawyer, or your spouse—nor anyone else authorized by means of a formal, corporately organized election or selection procedure. There is another sort of representative out there, someone you did not elect, someone you perhaps would not elect, of whom you may never have heard, speaking or acting on your behalf right now—they are an informal political representative.
Formal political representation is a familiar topic within democratic theory. Much less discussed, though no less widespread, is informal political representation: a practice in which a person speaks or acts for a group before an audience, despite never having been elected or selected to do so by means of a corporately organized election or selection procedure. Informal political representation is an everyday feature of our public communicative landscape. It is woven taut into the fabric of our political lives. Malala Yousafzai claims: “I speak not for myself, but so those without a voice can be heard.” U2 frontman Bono claims to “represent a lot of people who have no voice at all.” President Trump, before his nomination, was said “to give a voice to those who have long felt silenced."
The informal political representative, though neither elected nor selected, is ubiquitous and influential. They increase the visibility of marginalized and oppressed groups, give voice to interests not adequately expressed in formal political fora, influence public discourse, and serve as conduits between the represented and policymakers. They can, as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., did in Montgomery, negotiate on a group’s behalf. But so far, few have attempted to provide a theory of this phenomenon that gives full attention to its normative foundations. Not Just Speaking for Ourselves provides a theory of informal political representation that does not treat the phenomenon as a mere deviant case of formal political representation, but rather takes informal political representation on its own terms.
Papers
Published
Judicial Representation: Speaking for Others from the Bench - In Disability, Health, Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2020)
Under Review
Democracy Within, Justice Without: The Informal Political Representation of Unjustly Oppressed and Marginalized Groups
Informal representation can play an important and distinctive role in promoting a society of equals but, to do so, informal representatives must promote relationships with the represented that foreground such democratic values as respect, publicity, transparency, and openness to criticism, and that eschew domination and suppression of dissent.
In Progress
The Conscription of Informal Political Representatives
Informal political representation, the phenomenon of speaking or acting on behalf of others outside of formal political contexts, plays a crucial role in advancing the interests of groups, particularly marginalized and oppressed groups. I advance a new theory of the emergence conditions for becoming an informal political representative and explains how this theory allows us to get at key normative questions that are occluded by existing accounts.
Why Should Those Who Speak for Us Be Anything Like Us?
Why should those who speak for us be anything like us? I argue, contra widely endorsed principles long held by political representation theorists, in many cases, they shouldn't.
The Limits of Deference: Reexamining a Core Principle of Political Representation
When should those who speak for us defer to us about how to speak for us?
Speaking for Others from the Bench
Judicial representation occurs when, by virtue of what a judge says from the bench they come to speak or act on behalf of the members of a group whose interests are at stake in a case. This paper introduces and develops the concept of judicial representation as it arises in contexts where the represented group's members are, in some sense, unable to speak for themselves. It then advances an account of what a judge must know in order to be a good judicial representative.
Ways to learn more about my research: watch my talk at the Harvard Horizons Symposium, listen to or read my interview on The UnMute Podcast with Myisha Cherry, or read my interview with the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
In addition, I am in the early stages of developing two further projects: one concerns political action, the other concerns legal institutions.
My research has been generously supported by the following fellowships: the Collaborative Visiting Fellowship at the ConceptLab at the University of Oslo (June 2018); the Harvard Horizons Society Scholarship (2017-2018); the Andrew W. Mellon Sawyer Graduate Fellowship at Boston University (2017-2018); the Dissertation Completion Fellowship at Harvard University (2017-2018); the Martin Fellowship at the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University (Spring 2017); the Student Fellowship at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School (2016-2017); the Graduate Fellowship in Ethics at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University (2015-2016); the Bioethics Bootcamp Fellowship at the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania (June 2014); and the Student Fellowship at the Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences at Stanford Law School (2012-2013).